1 00:00:00,140 --> 00:00:04,130 Mhm . Mhm . Good 2 00:00:04,140 --> 00:00:07,150 afternoon everybody . Just a note up at 3 00:00:07,150 --> 00:00:09,180 the top . I think you probably know 4 00:00:09,180 --> 00:00:12,030 november marks National Veterans and 5 00:00:12,250 --> 00:00:14,840 Military Families month when we take 6 00:00:14,840 --> 00:00:16,896 some time to recognize and celebrate 7 00:00:16,896 --> 00:00:18,896 military families and the important 8 00:00:18,896 --> 00:00:21,007 role that they play in supporting the 9 00:00:21,007 --> 00:00:23,229 force . Our nation's service members do 10 00:00:23,229 --> 00:00:25,396 not serve alone alongside them are the 11 00:00:25,396 --> 00:00:27,396 dedicated members of their families 12 00:00:27,396 --> 00:00:29,618 whose commitment and resolve absolutely 13 00:00:29,618 --> 00:00:31,729 strengthen our nation and our ability 14 00:00:31,729 --> 00:00:33,600 to defend this nation . Military 15 00:00:33,600 --> 00:00:36,350 families are therefore critical and the 16 00:00:36,360 --> 00:00:39,430 Department of Defense recognizes the 17 00:00:39,440 --> 00:00:41,551 important role they play in the lives 18 00:00:41,551 --> 00:00:43,273 of our service members and our 19 00:00:43,273 --> 00:00:45,384 transitioning veterans as well as the 20 00:00:45,384 --> 00:00:47,551 individual achievements that they have 21 00:00:47,551 --> 00:00:49,662 accomplished for that reason and many 22 00:00:49,662 --> 00:00:51,662 more . We are grateful for all that 23 00:00:51,662 --> 00:00:53,718 they have done and continue to do to 24 00:00:53,718 --> 00:00:55,996 support those who keep the nation safe . 25 00:00:55,996 --> 00:00:55,920 And I know many of you who have covered 26 00:00:55,920 --> 00:00:58,142 the building for a long , long time . I 27 00:00:58,142 --> 00:01:00,031 have seen it firsthand . Just how 28 00:01:00,031 --> 00:01:02,170 absolutely critical our families are 29 00:01:02,180 --> 00:01:04,560 too our ability to get the job done . 30 00:01:04,560 --> 00:01:06,727 So I'm sure you share our appreciation 31 00:01:06,727 --> 00:01:09,630 for military families with that lead us 32 00:01:10,440 --> 00:01:13,730 john the vaccine deadlines are 33 00:01:13,730 --> 00:01:17,100 obviously pretty much upon . You . Can 34 00:01:17,100 --> 00:01:19,220 you the other day you said that 35 00:01:19,230 --> 00:01:22,810 obviously any decisions on 36 00:01:22,820 --> 00:01:26,260 vaccine exemptions or 37 00:01:26,260 --> 00:01:28,800 refusals is up to the services . But is 38 00:01:28,800 --> 00:01:31,350 there a broader concern across the 39 00:01:31,360 --> 00:01:33,471 Defense Department that you could get 40 00:01:33,471 --> 00:01:36,410 into situations where there are 41 00:01:36,420 --> 00:01:40,090 unequal punishments are unequal actions 42 00:01:40,090 --> 00:01:42,380 taken against service members based on 43 00:01:42,380 --> 00:01:45,430 commanders , individual actions and 44 00:01:45,430 --> 00:01:47,319 then do you also have any updated 45 00:01:47,319 --> 00:01:50,260 numbers ? So on the first question . I 46 00:01:50,260 --> 00:01:52,482 think the secretary has been very clear 47 00:01:52,482 --> 00:01:54,316 with the leaders of the military 48 00:01:54,316 --> 00:01:56,204 departments that he wants them to 49 00:01:56,240 --> 00:01:58,240 execute the mandate with a sense of 50 00:01:58,240 --> 00:02:01,770 compassion and understanding and uh and 51 00:02:01,770 --> 00:02:04,290 it's his expectation as well and I know 52 00:02:04,290 --> 00:02:06,457 he's made this clear to them that that 53 00:02:06,457 --> 00:02:08,623 he knows as a former commander himself 54 00:02:09,310 --> 00:02:11,510 that leaders have a range of tools 55 00:02:11,510 --> 00:02:14,700 available to them to help troops make 56 00:02:14,700 --> 00:02:16,867 the right decisions for themselves for 57 00:02:16,867 --> 00:02:19,089 their units , for the families short of 58 00:02:19,089 --> 00:02:21,033 using the uniform code of military 59 00:02:21,033 --> 00:02:23,144 justice , therefore short of punitive 60 00:02:23,144 --> 00:02:25,620 measures . And I think that's remains 61 00:02:25,620 --> 00:02:27,731 his expectation today that commanders 62 00:02:27,731 --> 00:02:29,840 will will will do that . But clearly 63 00:02:29,840 --> 00:02:32,910 it's a lawful order . Uh And so he also 64 00:02:32,910 --> 00:02:35,940 trusts that commanders uh will 65 00:02:36,100 --> 00:02:38,670 eventually it will ultimately do what 66 00:02:38,670 --> 00:02:41,120 they need to do for the readiness of 67 00:02:41,120 --> 00:02:44,220 their unit . And if that comes to doing 68 00:02:44,220 --> 00:02:46,331 something of a punitive nature , they 69 00:02:46,331 --> 00:02:48,387 certainly have that , right and that 70 00:02:48,387 --> 00:02:50,442 authority , it's just that Secretary 71 00:02:50,442 --> 00:02:52,498 wants them to exhaust other measures 72 00:02:52,498 --> 00:02:54,720 before having to do that . Now , as for 73 00:02:54,720 --> 00:02:56,831 uniformity . You mean ? Um the reason 74 00:02:56,831 --> 00:02:58,942 the U . C . M . J . Set up the way it 75 00:02:58,942 --> 00:03:02,080 is is so that there is a uh a menu of 76 00:03:02,080 --> 00:03:05,520 options for how commanders can deal 77 00:03:05,520 --> 00:03:07,853 with offenses against the U . C . M . J . 78 00:03:07,853 --> 00:03:10,650 For a violation of of lawful orders and 79 00:03:10,660 --> 00:03:12,716 each service . Each unit within each 80 00:03:12,716 --> 00:03:14,438 service has a different set of 81 00:03:14,438 --> 00:03:16,493 operational requirements and demands 82 00:03:16,493 --> 00:03:19,330 deployment schedules . Um optempo uh 83 00:03:19,340 --> 00:03:21,562 the Secretary very much doesn't want to 84 00:03:21,562 --> 00:03:23,229 be in the business of telling 85 00:03:23,229 --> 00:03:25,396 commanders at local levels exactly how 86 00:03:25,396 --> 00:03:29,270 um , if they have to result resolve 87 00:03:29,270 --> 00:03:32,150 themselves to using uh administrative 88 00:03:32,150 --> 00:03:34,900 or punitive measure that how exactly 89 00:03:34,900 --> 00:03:37,122 they should do that because they're the 90 00:03:37,122 --> 00:03:39,344 ones who would , they've been placed in 91 00:03:39,344 --> 00:03:41,500 a position of command . That's a 92 00:03:41,500 --> 00:03:43,900 position of trust and confidence . Um , 93 00:03:43,900 --> 00:03:46,370 and uh , and he wants to respect that 94 00:03:46,370 --> 00:03:48,592 trust and confidence of , of commanders 95 00:03:48,592 --> 00:03:50,648 to to do what they believe is in the 96 00:03:50,648 --> 00:03:52,730 best interest of of their unit and 97 00:03:52,740 --> 00:03:55,270 frankly with the individual members . 98 00:03:55,270 --> 00:03:58,430 So can we promise you that there will 99 00:03:58,430 --> 00:04:00,960 be absolute uniformity across the board ? 100 00:04:00,960 --> 00:04:03,070 No . And we wouldn't want to promise 101 00:04:03,070 --> 00:04:05,126 that because it wouldn't be the same 102 00:04:05,126 --> 00:04:08,460 way we handle orders , violations for 103 00:04:08,470 --> 00:04:10,637 other offenses as well . But again , I 104 00:04:10,637 --> 00:04:12,581 want to go back to the beginning , 105 00:04:12,581 --> 00:04:14,750 which is his expectation that this 106 00:04:14,750 --> 00:04:16,361 mandate will be handled in a 107 00:04:16,361 --> 00:04:18,583 compassionate way , in an understanding 108 00:04:18,583 --> 00:04:20,806 way and that uh , do counseling will be 109 00:04:20,806 --> 00:04:22,417 provided both from a medical 110 00:04:22,417 --> 00:04:24,306 perspective and from a leadership 111 00:04:24,306 --> 00:04:26,840 perspective to members who who are are 112 00:04:26,840 --> 00:04:30,270 declining uh , to uh , to take 113 00:04:30,410 --> 00:04:32,860 the to take the vaccine . Now , I would 114 00:04:32,860 --> 00:04:36,420 tell you that As of today , 97% of the 115 00:04:36,420 --> 00:04:39,050 active duty force has had at least one 116 00:04:39,050 --> 00:04:42,870 dose . This would include 99% of 117 00:04:42,880 --> 00:04:45,620 active duty sailors and With active 118 00:04:45,630 --> 00:04:49,110 airmen closely behind it around 97% and 119 00:04:49,110 --> 00:04:51,700 the Marine Corps is that 93% with one 120 00:04:51,700 --> 00:04:53,478 dose in the army also is in the 121 00:04:53,478 --> 00:04:55,533 90th%ile . So just in terms of first 122 00:04:55,533 --> 00:04:58,160 dosage ? Uh there's been a lot more 123 00:04:58,160 --> 00:05:01,420 progress and we continue to see men and 124 00:05:01,420 --> 00:05:03,740 women of the force doing the right 125 00:05:03,740 --> 00:05:06,460 thing which is getting vaccinated well . 126 00:05:06,470 --> 00:05:08,610 Just as a follow up , this is also 127 00:05:08,610 --> 00:05:11,030 gonna be industry with civilians . Um 128 00:05:11,040 --> 00:05:13,207 Has there been additional guidance put 129 00:05:13,207 --> 00:05:15,207 out on civilians about how you know 130 00:05:15,207 --> 00:05:17,318 who's gonna be the deciding authority 131 00:05:17,318 --> 00:05:19,429 and whose how is this going to happen 132 00:05:19,429 --> 00:05:21,350 for military commanders who have 133 00:05:21,350 --> 00:05:23,294 civilians working ? That's a great 134 00:05:23,294 --> 00:05:25,406 question . And we're still working on 135 00:05:25,406 --> 00:05:27,517 some additional implementing guidance 136 00:05:27,517 --> 00:05:29,572 for the civilian workforce and we we 137 00:05:29,572 --> 00:05:32,110 know we owe that to commanders and I 138 00:05:32,110 --> 00:05:34,166 think you'll be seeing more guidance 139 00:05:34,166 --> 00:05:36,332 coming out from the leadership here at 140 00:05:36,332 --> 00:05:38,443 the pentagon very very soon on that . 141 00:05:38,443 --> 00:05:40,499 That's a fair question . Megan . Has 142 00:05:40,499 --> 00:05:42,610 there been any discussion of updating 143 00:05:42,610 --> 00:05:44,943 the vaccine mandate to include boosters ? 144 00:05:44,943 --> 00:05:46,999 Is the defense health agency putting 145 00:05:46,999 --> 00:05:49,166 out guidance for service members about 146 00:05:49,166 --> 00:05:51,166 boosters or is it just our boosters 147 00:05:51,166 --> 00:05:53,332 available as they would be for anybody 148 00:05:53,332 --> 00:05:55,443 else ? I don't have a good answer for 149 00:05:55,443 --> 00:05:57,610 you on that Megan . I point you to D . 150 00:05:57,610 --> 00:05:59,832 H . A . If they do but I'm not aware of 151 00:05:59,832 --> 00:06:01,999 any imminent guidance right now coming 152 00:06:01,999 --> 00:06:03,999 out specifically about boosters but 153 00:06:03,999 --> 00:06:05,943 obviously we continue to encourage 154 00:06:05,943 --> 00:06:07,943 those who qualify for them and need 155 00:06:07,943 --> 00:06:10,460 them to get booster shots abraham , do 156 00:06:10,460 --> 00:06:12,682 you have your hand up to questions john 157 00:06:12,770 --> 00:06:14,937 first off , does the secretary believe 158 00:06:14,937 --> 00:06:17,570 that unvaccinated service members are 159 00:06:17,570 --> 00:06:19,740 deployable ? And then I have another 160 00:06:19,740 --> 00:06:22,500 question . The secretary will delegate 161 00:06:22,500 --> 00:06:24,740 that specific decision down to 162 00:06:24,750 --> 00:06:26,750 commanders at the appropriate level 163 00:06:26,750 --> 00:06:28,917 because when you say deployable , what 164 00:06:28,917 --> 00:06:31,028 does that mean ? They're , you know , 165 00:06:31,028 --> 00:06:33,028 they're different units , different 166 00:06:33,028 --> 00:06:35,361 services define deployments differently . 167 00:06:35,361 --> 00:06:37,528 Um And so he wants to let the services 168 00:06:37,528 --> 00:06:39,750 manage that decision making process for 169 00:06:39,750 --> 00:06:42,028 themselves and commanders specifically ? 170 00:06:42,028 --> 00:06:44,990 Obviously though he wants as he wants 171 00:06:44,990 --> 00:06:46,823 as much of the force as possible 172 00:06:46,823 --> 00:06:48,879 vaccinated because he still believes 173 00:06:48,879 --> 00:06:51,730 that that vaccinated forces and more 174 00:06:51,730 --> 00:06:54,480 ready force . A separate question , 175 00:06:54,540 --> 00:06:56,707 Does Secretary Austin have any kind of 176 00:06:56,707 --> 00:06:58,484 reaction to the meeting between 177 00:06:58,484 --> 00:07:00,596 President biden and Turkish President 178 00:07:00,596 --> 00:07:02,484 Erdogan Where they discussed F 16 179 00:07:02,484 --> 00:07:04,596 acquisition and getting kicked out of 180 00:07:04,596 --> 00:07:06,707 the 35 program ? Well , as you know , 181 00:07:06,707 --> 00:07:08,540 Turkey was removed from the F 35 182 00:07:08,540 --> 00:07:11,100 program back in july of 2019 following 183 00:07:11,100 --> 00:07:13,410 their acceptance of the S 400 air and 184 00:07:13,410 --> 00:07:17,040 missile defense system . Um And the 185 00:07:17,050 --> 00:07:19,180 department offense remains in 186 00:07:19,180 --> 00:07:21,180 consultation with Turkey to address 187 00:07:21,180 --> 00:07:23,291 remaining issues resulting from their 188 00:07:23,291 --> 00:07:25,513 removal from the program . With initial 189 00:07:25,513 --> 00:07:27,624 discussions , I think we talked about 190 00:07:27,624 --> 00:07:29,847 this last week occurring in Ankara just 191 00:07:29,847 --> 00:07:31,902 on the 27th of october . Um And then 192 00:07:31,902 --> 00:07:34,013 just in terms of the F sixteen's as a 193 00:07:34,013 --> 00:07:36,236 matter of policy , I think , you know , 194 00:07:36,236 --> 00:07:38,402 this Abraham , uh those issues foreign 195 00:07:38,402 --> 00:07:40,180 military sales issues are , are 196 00:07:40,180 --> 00:07:42,347 conducted by the Department of State . 197 00:07:42,347 --> 00:07:44,569 The Department of Defense won't comment 198 00:07:44,569 --> 00:07:46,780 uh or speculate about potential FMS 199 00:07:46,790 --> 00:07:50,730 going forward . So I have two questions 200 00:07:50,740 --> 00:07:54,050 to first , can you confirm 201 00:07:54,060 --> 00:07:57,940 that Russian troops are building up 202 00:07:57,950 --> 00:08:01,600 at the Ukrainian border ? What I can 203 00:08:01,600 --> 00:08:04,170 tell you is that we're aware of public 204 00:08:04,170 --> 00:08:07,120 reports of unusual Russian military 205 00:08:07,120 --> 00:08:09,470 activity near Ukraine and we're going 206 00:08:09,470 --> 00:08:11,637 to continue to consult with allies and 207 00:08:11,637 --> 00:08:13,803 partners on this issue . I can't speak 208 00:08:13,803 --> 00:08:15,803 for Russian intentions , but we are 209 00:08:15,803 --> 00:08:18,026 certainly monitoring the region closely 210 00:08:18,026 --> 00:08:20,137 as we always do Sylvie . And as we've 211 00:08:20,137 --> 00:08:21,914 said before , any escalatory or 212 00:08:21,914 --> 00:08:23,970 aggressive actions would be of great 213 00:08:23,970 --> 00:08:25,859 concern to the United States . We 214 00:08:25,859 --> 00:08:27,914 continue to support de escalation in 215 00:08:27,914 --> 00:08:30,081 the region and a diplomatic resolution 216 00:08:30,081 --> 00:08:32,137 to the conflict in eastern Ukraine . 217 00:08:32,137 --> 00:08:34,248 And you heard the Secretary addressed 218 00:08:34,248 --> 00:08:34,200 that exact issue when we were over 219 00:08:34,200 --> 00:08:36,680 there just a week or so ago . And my 220 00:08:36,680 --> 00:08:39,510 second question is about the meeting 221 00:08:39,510 --> 00:08:42,040 that President biden and President 222 00:08:42,040 --> 00:08:45,190 Macron had uh last week . 223 00:08:45,200 --> 00:08:48,650 And uh there was a statement , a common 224 00:08:48,650 --> 00:08:51,360 statement at the end and in this 225 00:08:51,360 --> 00:08:54,630 statement , it's uh said that the US 226 00:08:54,630 --> 00:08:57,770 has committed additional assets in the 227 00:08:57,770 --> 00:09:00,690 sale to support counterterrorism 228 00:09:00,700 --> 00:09:03,410 efforts led by France . What kind of 229 00:09:03,410 --> 00:09:06,200 additional assets uh is it 230 00:09:06,210 --> 00:09:09,660 uh troops or is it equipment ? 231 00:09:10,740 --> 00:09:13,860 So actually the secretary and uh 232 00:09:14,340 --> 00:09:16,580 his french counterpart , Minister 233 00:09:16,580 --> 00:09:18,770 parley talked about the saddle is one 234 00:09:18,770 --> 00:09:20,881 of many things they talked about when 235 00:09:20,881 --> 00:09:22,714 they met on the sidelines of the 236 00:09:22,714 --> 00:09:24,881 defense ministerial in brussels a week 237 00:09:24,881 --> 00:09:27,700 or so ago um and we have in fact 238 00:09:27,710 --> 00:09:29,760 committed to continuing to support 239 00:09:30,140 --> 00:09:32,330 french operations in the operations 240 00:09:32,330 --> 00:09:35,580 which uh we believe are vital to 241 00:09:35,590 --> 00:09:37,650 helping to deal with the terrorism 242 00:09:37,650 --> 00:09:39,817 threat in that part of the world . I'm 243 00:09:39,817 --> 00:09:41,317 not gonna I don't have any 244 00:09:41,317 --> 00:09:43,428 announcements today nor am I going to 245 00:09:43,428 --> 00:09:45,428 get into specifics about what those 246 00:09:45,428 --> 00:09:48,670 assets are . But I would um I would 247 00:09:48,680 --> 00:09:50,736 disabuse you of the notion that it's 248 00:09:50,736 --> 00:09:53,100 all about hardware um when we're 249 00:09:53,100 --> 00:09:56,600 talking about helping our french allies 250 00:09:56,610 --> 00:09:58,832 in that part of the world . Yes , there 251 00:09:58,832 --> 00:10:02,090 will be some material support uh some 252 00:10:02,090 --> 00:10:05,710 of that in the realm of uh helping them 253 00:10:05,720 --> 00:10:08,890 with I . S . R . But it also will 254 00:10:08,900 --> 00:10:12,490 involve some additional training and 255 00:10:12,490 --> 00:10:14,546 that kind of thing . So it's not all 256 00:10:14,546 --> 00:10:16,930 about just additional hardware . I know 257 00:10:16,930 --> 00:10:18,986 when we see the word assets , that's 258 00:10:18,986 --> 00:10:21,208 what we tend to think , but it's really 259 00:10:21,208 --> 00:10:23,319 more comprehensive than that and it's 260 00:10:23,319 --> 00:10:25,430 really a continuation of the kinds of 261 00:10:25,430 --> 00:10:27,652 things that we've been already doing to 262 00:10:27,652 --> 00:10:29,763 help the french operation . There are 263 00:10:29,763 --> 00:10:31,374 no troops . I don't have any 264 00:10:31,374 --> 00:10:33,208 announcements to make today with 265 00:10:33,208 --> 00:10:35,750 respect to uh to what uh what that 266 00:10:35,750 --> 00:10:38,910 support will materialize . But uh at 267 00:10:38,910 --> 00:10:41,290 this time it's it's really more about 268 00:10:41,300 --> 00:10:43,522 helping them in a comprehensive way . I 269 00:10:43,522 --> 00:10:45,633 don't have any true pronouncements to 270 00:10:45,633 --> 00:10:47,800 speak to . Yeah , real . Thank you . I 271 00:10:47,800 --> 00:10:49,911 want to grow up about these questions 272 00:10:49,911 --> 00:10:52,240 about the U . S . Uh Grass joint 273 00:10:52,240 --> 00:10:54,880 statement . The statement also says the 274 00:10:54,880 --> 00:10:56,991 U . S . Will increase the support and 275 00:10:56,991 --> 00:11:00,760 material contribution to the europe Urz 276 00:11:01,140 --> 00:11:03,690 deployment of military assets to in the 277 00:11:03,690 --> 00:11:07,390 past week region . So what support and 278 00:11:07,390 --> 00:11:10,360 material contribution where the U . S . 279 00:11:10,370 --> 00:11:13,380 Increased to help them deploy warships 280 00:11:13,380 --> 00:11:16,360 or aircraft to the region . Yeah again 281 00:11:16,360 --> 00:11:19,950 I think it's gonna be a range of 282 00:11:20,340 --> 00:11:22,860 of support that we can help provide 283 00:11:22,870 --> 00:11:25,660 over time and it's gonna be a function 284 00:11:25,660 --> 00:11:28,020 of bilateral discussions that we have 285 00:11:28,020 --> 00:11:30,020 with the french . We know they have 286 00:11:30,310 --> 00:11:32,990 significant and real security interests 287 00:11:32,990 --> 00:11:35,101 in the indo pacific for instance , we 288 00:11:35,101 --> 00:11:37,101 supported Francis rafael deployment 289 00:11:37,101 --> 00:11:39,460 across the region back in july which 290 00:11:39,460 --> 00:11:42,000 we're very proud to do . Um and we have 291 00:11:42,000 --> 00:11:44,167 a long history of military cooperation 292 00:11:44,167 --> 00:11:46,222 and I think you're just going to see 293 00:11:46,222 --> 00:11:48,056 that continue to mature as we go 294 00:11:48,056 --> 00:11:50,950 forward . Okay . Yeah on the meeting in 295 00:11:50,950 --> 00:11:54,540 Ankara we'll just give us a uh huh 296 00:11:55,440 --> 00:11:57,662 more and more inside actually into this 297 00:11:57,662 --> 00:11:59,790 meeting . What are the points of 298 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:01,633 discussion ? What is the dispute 299 00:12:01,633 --> 00:12:04,280 currently between Turkey and the United 300 00:12:04,280 --> 00:12:06,700 States ? I wouldn't characterize it as 301 00:12:06,700 --> 00:12:10,650 a dispute . We had a discussion back in 302 00:12:10,780 --> 00:12:13,410 late october just a week or so ago 303 00:12:13,420 --> 00:12:17,400 about um about the process 304 00:12:17,410 --> 00:12:20,660 uh you know the decision removal which 305 00:12:20,660 --> 00:12:23,350 is done and sort of what does that , 306 00:12:23,740 --> 00:12:25,907 what does that mean bilaterally for us 307 00:12:25,907 --> 00:12:27,740 going forward ? So it was a very 308 00:12:27,740 --> 00:12:30,530 productive discussion . Uh It wasn't it 309 00:12:30,530 --> 00:12:34,480 wasn't uh it wasn't anything other than 310 00:12:34,480 --> 00:12:37,530 professional and tone um NATO . I'm 311 00:12:37,530 --> 00:12:40,870 sorry , Turkey remains a valuable NATO 312 00:12:40,880 --> 00:12:44,720 ally uh with whom we share 313 00:12:44,720 --> 00:12:47,280 lots of common interests and uh we we 314 00:12:47,280 --> 00:12:49,502 want to continue to make sure that from 315 00:12:49,502 --> 00:12:52,940 an alliance perspective that uh that We 316 00:12:52,940 --> 00:12:54,940 can continue to work with Turkey on 317 00:12:54,940 --> 00:12:57,162 shared security interests going forward 318 00:12:57,162 --> 00:12:59,273 but that the meeting was really about 319 00:12:59,273 --> 00:13:02,320 the F- 35 program and uh income and and 320 00:13:02,320 --> 00:13:05,070 the removal process itself , it doesn't 321 00:13:05,070 --> 00:13:09,070 mean that That bilaterally we are 322 00:13:09,070 --> 00:13:11,292 going to still look for ways to to work 323 00:13:11,292 --> 00:13:13,514 closely with Turkey . Just just on that 324 00:13:13,514 --> 00:13:15,737 point , I know you won't talk about the 325 00:13:15,737 --> 00:13:18,410 Turkish request for f . 16 , but Turkey 326 00:13:18,410 --> 00:13:20,354 is putting a discourse saying that 327 00:13:20,640 --> 00:13:23,970 actually do this request also is not 328 00:13:23,970 --> 00:13:26,230 only important for the Turkish national 329 00:13:26,230 --> 00:13:29,030 security but also the security and 330 00:13:29,030 --> 00:13:32,460 capability of NATO . Do you think that 331 00:13:32,470 --> 00:13:35,000 a viable Turkish air force 332 00:13:35,540 --> 00:13:38,930 should be there for NATO ? Again , I'm 333 00:13:38,930 --> 00:13:40,986 not going to get to the specifics of 334 00:13:40,986 --> 00:13:42,930 potential foreign military sales . 335 00:13:42,930 --> 00:13:45,097 That's a that's the realm of the State 336 00:13:45,097 --> 00:13:44,870 Department and would be inappropriate 337 00:13:44,870 --> 00:13:46,926 for us to talk about . But I will go 338 00:13:46,926 --> 00:13:49,037 back to what I said before . They are 339 00:13:49,037 --> 00:13:51,350 valued and uh an important NATO ally . 340 00:13:51,360 --> 00:13:54,520 Um And in the context of our alliance 341 00:13:54,520 --> 00:13:56,742 and quite frankly in the context of the 342 00:13:56,742 --> 00:14:00,340 bilateral Uh security relationship , uh 343 00:14:00,350 --> 00:14:02,294 it's important to continue to have 344 00:14:02,294 --> 00:14:04,350 discussions with Turkey about how to 345 00:14:04,350 --> 00:14:06,572 move forward . Uh and we're going to do 346 00:14:06,572 --> 00:14:08,739 that . But I'm not gonna speculate one 347 00:14:08,739 --> 00:14:08,360 way or the other about the f . 16 . 348 00:14:08,840 --> 00:14:11,670 Just one last question in Syria , 349 00:14:11,670 --> 00:14:15,500 Russians have deployed S . U . 35 to 350 00:14:15,510 --> 00:14:17,650 commercially . That is Eastern Syria 351 00:14:17,650 --> 00:14:19,706 close to the Turkey , to the U . S . 352 00:14:19,706 --> 00:14:21,940 Forces . Are you concerned about that 353 00:14:21,940 --> 00:14:24,850 or have you discussed with Russians ? I 354 00:14:24,860 --> 00:14:27,082 don't I don't I don't I can't speak for 355 00:14:27,082 --> 00:14:29,193 Russian deployments inside Syria . As 356 00:14:29,193 --> 00:14:31,138 you know , we have a deconfliction 357 00:14:31,138 --> 00:14:33,193 channel with the Russians which does 358 00:14:33,193 --> 00:14:35,304 work and we do use it uh to make sure 359 00:14:35,304 --> 00:14:37,360 that there isn't miscalculation . Um 360 00:14:37,360 --> 00:14:39,840 and uh and unintended consequences and 361 00:14:39,840 --> 00:14:41,840 we're going to continue to use that 362 00:14:41,840 --> 00:14:44,780 deconfliction channel Kourtney . So uh 363 00:14:44,790 --> 00:14:47,430 if about 3% of the air force hasn't 364 00:14:47,430 --> 00:14:49,708 been vaccinated yet as of this morning , 365 00:14:49,708 --> 00:14:52,420 that Rough Math is about 10,000 . I'm 366 00:14:52,420 --> 00:14:54,920 not mistaken . So what happens tomorrow 367 00:14:54,920 --> 00:14:58,910 morning To those 10,000 when 368 00:14:58,910 --> 00:15:01,260 they show up at work ? Are they already 369 00:15:01,260 --> 00:15:03,371 are some people already in counseling 370 00:15:03,371 --> 00:15:06,230 to some sort of process already begin 371 00:15:06,230 --> 00:15:09,690 right away for to get them to do 372 00:15:09,700 --> 00:15:11,922 because presumably many of them already 373 00:15:11,922 --> 00:15:14,144 have made clear that they don't want to 374 00:15:14,144 --> 00:15:17,230 get vaccinated . Um Then may already 375 00:15:17,230 --> 00:15:19,520 have had some sort of counseling . So 376 00:15:19,520 --> 00:15:21,742 what what happened ? I mean I know it's 377 00:15:21,742 --> 00:15:23,798 a it's a small percentage but it's a 378 00:15:23,798 --> 00:15:25,853 lot of people I'm not disputing your 379 00:15:25,853 --> 00:15:28,076 math court . But that's really a better 380 00:15:28,076 --> 00:15:30,187 question put to the Air Force again , 381 00:15:30,187 --> 00:15:30,130 the secretary trust the military 382 00:15:30,130 --> 00:15:32,352 departments to deal with this mandatory 383 00:15:32,352 --> 00:15:35,400 vaccine and the way they deem best fit 384 00:15:35,410 --> 00:15:38,100 and I think the Air Force has received 385 00:15:38,100 --> 00:15:41,120 and has granted um some exemptions 386 00:15:41,130 --> 00:15:43,570 administratively and from a medical 387 00:15:43,570 --> 00:15:45,626 perspective , so some of that number 388 00:15:45,640 --> 00:15:48,990 that that is definitely gonna be 389 00:15:49,000 --> 00:15:51,680 inside approved exemptions the rest of 390 00:15:51,680 --> 00:15:53,736 them . Again , I don't know what the 391 00:15:53,736 --> 00:15:55,736 exact figures will be , but the Air 392 00:15:55,736 --> 00:15:57,902 Force is the best place to go in terms 393 00:15:57,902 --> 00:16:00,880 of what their plans are post the 394 00:16:00,890 --> 00:16:02,760 deadline . What qualifies as an 395 00:16:02,760 --> 00:16:05,020 administrative exemption ? Sometimes it 396 00:16:05,020 --> 00:16:09,000 could be somebody who um they plan on 397 00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:11,750 retiring in a month or so or they're 398 00:16:11,750 --> 00:16:13,806 going to separate . That could be an 399 00:16:13,806 --> 00:16:16,350 administrative exemption . Religious 400 00:16:16,950 --> 00:16:20,520 ministry . I'm not going to speak for 401 00:16:20,520 --> 00:16:23,250 the Air Force and their specific , Are 402 00:16:23,250 --> 00:16:25,472 you aware of any religious exemptions ? 403 00:16:25,472 --> 00:16:27,800 I do not have direct knowledge of 404 00:16:27,800 --> 00:16:30,078 religious exemptions from the services . 405 00:16:30,078 --> 00:16:32,133 Again , I'd point you back to them . 406 00:16:32,133 --> 00:16:33,800 They handle that process . My 407 00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:35,856 understanding is that in some of the 408 00:16:35,856 --> 00:16:37,800 services , they do count religious 409 00:16:37,800 --> 00:16:39,856 exemptions as part of administrative 410 00:16:39,856 --> 00:16:39,790 exemptions , but it's not uniform 411 00:16:39,790 --> 00:16:41,957 across the board . So I point you back 412 00:16:41,957 --> 00:16:44,179 to the services specifically for that . 413 00:16:45,140 --> 00:16:48,500 Yeah , one yesterday at the White House , 414 00:16:48,510 --> 00:16:50,621 sunday afternoon put out an executive 415 00:16:50,621 --> 00:16:52,890 order that gives you a secretary for 416 00:16:52,890 --> 00:16:54,946 acquisition and sustainment released 417 00:16:54,946 --> 00:16:56,946 authority from the national Defense 418 00:16:56,946 --> 00:16:58,834 stockpile ? I already thought , I 419 00:16:58,834 --> 00:17:01,168 thought they already had that authority . 420 00:17:01,168 --> 00:17:03,223 Can you give a sense of whether this 421 00:17:03,223 --> 00:17:02,900 was a turn of the screw or some 422 00:17:02,900 --> 00:17:05,550 significant executive wouldn't describe 423 00:17:05,550 --> 00:17:07,550 it as a turn of the screw . I think 424 00:17:07,550 --> 00:17:09,772 it's a decision that the president felt 425 00:17:09,772 --> 00:17:11,939 was important to make given the supply 426 00:17:11,939 --> 00:17:13,883 chain problems that we have in the 427 00:17:13,883 --> 00:17:15,828 country . What was a system before 428 00:17:15,828 --> 00:17:17,828 sunday in terms of the way national 429 00:17:17,828 --> 00:17:19,994 stockpile materials were going to take 430 00:17:19,994 --> 00:17:22,217 that question Tony because I don't know 431 00:17:22,217 --> 00:17:24,328 exactly how the defense , this is the 432 00:17:24,328 --> 00:17:26,383 defense stockpile . National Defense 433 00:17:26,383 --> 00:17:28,717 stockpile , not the strategic stockpile , 434 00:17:28,717 --> 00:17:30,883 which deals with medical things . This 435 00:17:30,883 --> 00:17:33,120 is really about rare earth minerals and 436 00:17:33,120 --> 00:17:35,120 that kind of thing . So let me take 437 00:17:35,120 --> 00:17:37,231 that question for you because I don't 438 00:17:37,231 --> 00:17:39,120 want to guess on exactly what the 439 00:17:39,120 --> 00:17:41,390 process was before the EO second 440 00:17:41,390 --> 00:17:43,223 question . General heighten last 441 00:17:43,223 --> 00:17:45,223 thursday before the Defense Writers 442 00:17:45,223 --> 00:17:47,112 Group bemoaned the classification 443 00:17:47,112 --> 00:17:49,520 system . He says we're going to have to 444 00:17:49,520 --> 00:17:51,520 change the classification structure 445 00:17:51,520 --> 00:17:53,242 that we have not to declassify 446 00:17:53,242 --> 00:17:55,298 everything . That would be foolish . 447 00:17:55,298 --> 00:17:57,464 But it's so highly classified now that 448 00:17:57,464 --> 00:17:59,353 you can't talk about anything and 449 00:17:59,353 --> 00:18:01,687 that's a mistake . What's your reaction ? 450 00:18:01,687 --> 00:18:03,853 Is someone who's been in this building 451 00:18:03,853 --> 00:18:06,020 on and off for like 20 years . I think 452 00:18:06,020 --> 00:18:07,853 the achieving the proper balance 453 00:18:07,853 --> 00:18:09,576 between operational security , 454 00:18:09,576 --> 00:18:11,742 protecting information of the national 455 00:18:11,742 --> 00:18:15,560 security nature and the absolute 456 00:18:16,240 --> 00:18:18,570 commensurate requirement to be as 457 00:18:18,570 --> 00:18:20,459 transparent with you and with the 458 00:18:20,459 --> 00:18:22,292 american people as possible as a 459 00:18:22,292 --> 00:18:24,459 balance . We're trying to strike every 460 00:18:24,459 --> 00:18:27,760 day and uh , there's absolutely no 461 00:18:27,760 --> 00:18:29,760 question that there's times when we 462 00:18:29,760 --> 00:18:31,927 don't get that balance right when we , 463 00:18:31,927 --> 00:18:35,440 um , uh , could be more 464 00:18:35,440 --> 00:18:37,750 transparent in some cases than , than 465 00:18:37,750 --> 00:18:39,861 we than we are . I mean I'm not gonna 466 00:18:39,861 --> 00:18:42,680 stand up here and and say that we that 467 00:18:42,680 --> 00:18:45,540 we always that we're always as far 468 00:18:45,550 --> 00:18:47,661 forward leaning as we should be . But 469 00:18:47,661 --> 00:18:51,160 it is to be fair , it's a 470 00:18:52,040 --> 00:18:54,151 it's a struggle that we're constantly 471 00:18:54,151 --> 00:18:55,984 dealing with this , this balance 472 00:18:55,984 --> 00:18:58,680 between Opsec and transparency . How 473 00:18:58,680 --> 00:19:00,736 successful have you been in the last 474 00:19:00,736 --> 00:19:02,736 since you've been in office pushing 475 00:19:02,736 --> 00:19:04,958 back , striking the balance more on the 476 00:19:04,958 --> 00:19:06,791 side of transparency than that's 477 00:19:06,791 --> 00:19:08,847 suppression ? I mean , I can't speak 478 00:19:08,847 --> 00:19:10,958 for every office here in the pentagon 479 00:19:10,958 --> 00:19:14,290 Tony , me personally , I mean Uh huh I 480 00:19:14,300 --> 00:19:18,060 can tell you that . I uh I certainly do 481 00:19:18,060 --> 00:19:20,660 the best I can hear from the podium and 482 00:19:21,140 --> 00:19:24,040 the secretary's guidance is to be as 483 00:19:24,040 --> 00:19:26,170 forward leaning as we can be . But 484 00:19:26,170 --> 00:19:28,114 again , I also have a commensurate 485 00:19:28,114 --> 00:19:31,030 requirement to protect information of a 486 00:19:31,030 --> 00:19:33,350 national security nature and so we do 487 00:19:33,350 --> 00:19:37,050 that . I mean I'm sure that 488 00:19:37,060 --> 00:19:39,171 if I went back after today's briefing 489 00:19:39,171 --> 00:19:41,980 and your question and and graded myself 490 00:19:41,980 --> 00:19:44,360 that I would not be getting an A plus , 491 00:19:44,370 --> 00:19:47,790 I admit that , but but I can tell you 492 00:19:47,790 --> 00:19:50,120 that we constantly try to be as forward 493 00:19:50,120 --> 00:19:52,231 leaning and as open as transparent as 494 00:19:52,231 --> 00:19:54,550 we can be . Push it . Thank you , yep . 495 00:19:55,440 --> 00:19:57,496 Um hang on , just second , I need to 496 00:19:57,496 --> 00:19:59,718 get to the phones and then I'll come to 497 00:19:59,718 --> 00:20:02,740 you and then over to you , Jeff Chicago . 498 00:20:02,740 --> 00:20:04,851 I think you're here at the top of the 499 00:20:04,851 --> 00:20:06,962 list here today . Thank you very much 500 00:20:06,962 --> 00:20:09,090 and thank you to your staff for being 501 00:20:09,090 --> 00:20:11,570 so helpful on the question of David's 502 00:20:11,570 --> 00:20:14,080 taking down pictures and videos from 503 00:20:14,080 --> 00:20:16,600 Afghanistan . I was wondering if you 504 00:20:16,600 --> 00:20:18,410 could address why the Defense 505 00:20:18,410 --> 00:20:20,780 Department didn't publicly announce 506 00:20:20,790 --> 00:20:23,210 when it took down so many pictures and 507 00:20:23,220 --> 00:20:25,820 images from Afghanistan , why it was 508 00:20:25,830 --> 00:20:28,540 doing so in the criteria it used in 509 00:20:28,540 --> 00:20:31,440 order to remove those images questions 510 00:20:31,440 --> 00:20:33,162 Jeff . So let me level set for 511 00:20:33,162 --> 00:20:35,329 everybody in case you don't understand 512 00:20:35,329 --> 00:20:38,460 what Jeff has asked , asking about um 513 00:20:39,540 --> 00:20:41,762 throughout the course of the evacuation 514 00:20:41,762 --> 00:20:44,040 in august and then well into september . 515 00:20:44,040 --> 00:20:46,151 And this gets to Jeff's question of , 516 00:20:46,151 --> 00:20:48,318 you know , why we didn't announce what 517 00:20:48,318 --> 00:20:50,510 we did was in in order to protect the 518 00:20:50,510 --> 00:20:53,230 identities of afghans who worked for us 519 00:20:53,230 --> 00:20:55,452 and afghans at the time , we were still 520 00:20:55,452 --> 00:20:57,508 trying to get out of the country and 521 00:20:57,508 --> 00:20:59,674 frankly , still are today . We did not 522 00:20:59,674 --> 00:21:02,840 delete , but we took off publicly 523 00:21:02,840 --> 00:21:06,280 accessible platforms and archived for 524 00:21:06,290 --> 00:21:08,450 future republication at , at a later 525 00:21:08,450 --> 00:21:12,040 date , we removed thousands of uh still 526 00:21:12,040 --> 00:21:15,860 imagery and videos that would show 527 00:21:16,340 --> 00:21:18,780 The faces or any other identifiable 528 00:21:18,780 --> 00:21:21,590 information about many of the Afghans 529 00:21:21,590 --> 00:21:23,980 that we have worked for and we've 530 00:21:23,980 --> 00:21:25,980 supported and who have supported us 531 00:21:25,980 --> 00:21:27,869 over the last 20 years . It was a 532 00:21:27,869 --> 00:21:30,036 mammoth undertaking . And it took us a 533 00:21:30,036 --> 00:21:32,258 long time , almost two months . And the 534 00:21:32,258 --> 00:21:34,258 reason why I didn't announce it was 535 00:21:34,258 --> 00:21:36,369 because we were in the middle of it . 536 00:21:36,369 --> 00:21:38,780 And it wouldn't make much sense to tell 537 00:21:38,790 --> 00:21:41,320 the world that we were archiving these 538 00:21:41,320 --> 00:21:43,376 images before we were done archiving 539 00:21:43,376 --> 00:21:45,580 them . Um , and because it is still an 540 00:21:45,580 --> 00:21:47,747 ongoing effort , frankly , this is not 541 00:21:47,747 --> 00:21:49,858 the kind of thing that I wanted to be 542 00:21:49,858 --> 00:21:51,969 able to have to talk about because we 543 00:21:51,969 --> 00:21:54,191 are still trying to get many of these , 544 00:21:54,191 --> 00:21:56,413 uh , these afghans out of the country . 545 00:21:56,420 --> 00:21:58,531 So we , we did it out of an abundance 546 00:21:58,531 --> 00:22:00,531 of caution , out of respect for the 547 00:22:00,531 --> 00:22:02,476 obligation that we have that these 548 00:22:02,476 --> 00:22:04,642 individuals into their families and at 549 00:22:04,642 --> 00:22:06,809 the right time when it's appropriate . 550 00:22:06,809 --> 00:22:08,976 Um , uh , we will absolutely republish 551 00:22:08,976 --> 00:22:11,031 those images . They , those images , 552 00:22:11,031 --> 00:22:12,976 they haven't gone anywhere , their 553 00:22:12,976 --> 00:22:15,198 archives there safe and sound and we'll 554 00:22:15,198 --> 00:22:14,990 put them back in the public domain when 555 00:22:14,990 --> 00:22:17,212 we think it's the right time to do that 556 00:22:17,940 --> 00:22:20,060 nancy . A couple of clarifying 557 00:22:20,060 --> 00:22:22,060 questions . And then the question I 558 00:22:22,060 --> 00:22:24,460 wanted to ask you on Tommy's question 559 00:22:24,460 --> 00:22:27,920 about the executive order . Um , can 560 00:22:27,920 --> 00:22:29,950 you find out for us if there's any 561 00:22:29,950 --> 00:22:32,117 limitations on that because the person 562 00:22:32,117 --> 00:22:34,172 who is delegated to do that is in an 563 00:22:34,172 --> 00:22:36,228 acting capacity . And I'm curious if 564 00:22:36,228 --> 00:22:38,339 that limits in any way for ability to 565 00:22:38,339 --> 00:22:40,228 carry out that order and what the 566 00:22:40,228 --> 00:22:42,061 status is on naming someone in a 567 00:22:42,061 --> 00:22:43,950 permanent position . I know of no 568 00:22:43,950 --> 00:22:47,260 limitations on the acting officials to 569 00:22:47,260 --> 00:22:50,110 execute the ceo , none whatsoever . Um , 570 00:22:50,110 --> 00:22:52,240 I don't have an update for you from a 571 00:22:52,250 --> 00:22:54,472 personnel announcement perspective , as 572 00:22:54,472 --> 00:22:56,528 I've said before , we understand the 573 00:22:56,528 --> 00:22:58,472 criticality of this position . The 574 00:22:58,472 --> 00:23:00,694 Secretary's certainly focused on making 575 00:23:00,694 --> 00:23:00,320 sure that we get the best talent here 576 00:23:00,320 --> 00:23:02,920 at the pentagon . Uh and when we have 577 00:23:02,920 --> 00:23:04,976 personnel announcements to make , we 578 00:23:04,976 --> 00:23:07,031 certainly will actually in this case 579 00:23:07,031 --> 00:23:09,087 the president will . But you get the 580 00:23:09,087 --> 00:23:11,198 point . And then to Jeff's question , 581 00:23:11,198 --> 00:23:13,198 can you give us a sense of how many 582 00:23:13,198 --> 00:23:15,420 thousands were taken down ? Was there a 583 00:23:15,420 --> 00:23:17,587 specific threat that led to this ? And 584 00:23:17,587 --> 00:23:19,642 who made the determination of taking 585 00:23:19,642 --> 00:23:21,642 them down ? The criteria for taking 586 00:23:21,642 --> 00:23:24,570 them down ? And what was the allow for 587 00:23:24,570 --> 00:23:26,514 them to be Republican ? There were 588 00:23:26,514 --> 00:23:29,070 approximately 124,000 photographs , 589 00:23:29,070 --> 00:23:32,190 still images and about 17,000 videos 590 00:23:32,940 --> 00:23:35,640 that remain unpublished . Um I 591 00:23:35,640 --> 00:23:38,760 delegated it was my decision and I 592 00:23:38,760 --> 00:23:42,140 delegated it to uh the leadership at 593 00:23:42,140 --> 00:23:44,310 the defense media activity uh to use 594 00:23:44,310 --> 00:23:47,690 their best judgment . My guidance was I 595 00:23:47,700 --> 00:23:50,540 want any imagery that could be used to 596 00:23:50,540 --> 00:23:53,280 identify Individuals and or family 597 00:23:53,280 --> 00:23:55,502 members over the last 20 years of war . 598 00:23:55,502 --> 00:23:57,380 I wanted to be unpublished for a 599 00:23:57,380 --> 00:23:59,324 temporary period of time and it is 600 00:23:59,324 --> 00:24:01,730 temporary . And it was done out of an 601 00:24:01,730 --> 00:24:03,619 abundance of caution . It was not 602 00:24:03,619 --> 00:24:05,341 spared by a specific threat or 603 00:24:05,341 --> 00:24:07,397 reference to any photos that use the 604 00:24:07,397 --> 00:24:09,341 target . And again , we had reason 605 00:24:09,341 --> 00:24:11,508 enough to believe nancy . And you know 606 00:24:11,508 --> 00:24:13,674 this from covering the evacuation that 607 00:24:13,674 --> 00:24:15,870 the Taliban were going . Uh we were 608 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:18,240 concerned that they were going to seek 609 00:24:18,240 --> 00:24:21,030 out people who helped us over time or 610 00:24:21,040 --> 00:24:24,690 relatives and families . Uh I think 611 00:24:24,690 --> 00:24:27,800 those concerns were valid and um we 612 00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:29,911 make no apology whatsoever for making 613 00:24:29,911 --> 00:24:32,078 this decision . I still believe it was 614 00:24:32,078 --> 00:24:34,244 the right thing to do and at the right 615 00:24:34,244 --> 00:24:36,578 time ? Well , absolutely republish them . 616 00:24:36,578 --> 00:24:38,800 That this is not nothing's been deleted 617 00:24:38,800 --> 00:24:40,800 from the record . It's simply being 618 00:24:40,800 --> 00:24:43,022 archived until we believe it's it's the 619 00:24:43,022 --> 00:24:45,189 appropriate time to put them back up . 620 00:24:45,189 --> 00:24:47,244 And then I wanted to ask you about a 621 00:24:47,244 --> 00:24:49,356 statement that um oh is he put out on 622 00:24:49,356 --> 00:24:51,522 the 15th about a call between dr Colin 623 00:24:51,522 --> 00:24:54,620 call and the head of the NGO for um Mr 624 00:24:54,620 --> 00:24:57,040 Abedi who was killed on august 29th . 625 00:24:57,050 --> 00:25:00,850 In that statement , the OSI said that 626 00:25:00,860 --> 00:25:02,693 there was a commitment from this 627 00:25:02,693 --> 00:25:04,582 department to offering condolence 628 00:25:04,582 --> 00:25:06,582 payments is included and in working 629 00:25:06,582 --> 00:25:08,471 with the State Department to help 630 00:25:08,471 --> 00:25:10,249 support his family members were 631 00:25:10,249 --> 00:25:12,416 interested in relocating to the United 632 00:25:12,416 --> 00:25:14,360 States . It's been about two weeks 633 00:25:14,360 --> 00:25:13,520 since that same ones released . I 634 00:25:13,570 --> 00:25:15,792 wonder if there is any update on either 635 00:25:15,792 --> 00:25:17,792 condolence payments or helping them 636 00:25:17,792 --> 00:25:19,970 leave if they choose to . I don't have 637 00:25:19,970 --> 00:25:21,914 an update for you . We are working 638 00:25:21,914 --> 00:25:23,970 closely with the State Department on 639 00:25:23,970 --> 00:25:26,026 both ends . If there is something to 640 00:25:26,026 --> 00:25:28,248 update you with ? We will absolutely do 641 00:25:28,248 --> 00:25:30,359 that . Can you give me a sense then , 642 00:25:30,359 --> 00:25:32,470 is there one of the concerns that the 643 00:25:32,470 --> 00:25:34,692 families that expresses because they've 644 00:25:34,692 --> 00:25:36,803 gotten so much attention that they're 645 00:25:36,803 --> 00:25:38,692 increasingly targeted or could be 646 00:25:38,692 --> 00:25:40,748 targeted by the Taliban . Is there a 647 00:25:40,748 --> 00:25:42,692 timeline with which the department 648 00:25:42,692 --> 00:25:44,692 hopes to either get payments or get 649 00:25:44,692 --> 00:25:46,748 them an answer on evacuation ? We're 650 00:25:46,748 --> 00:25:48,803 working through the timing of the ex 651 00:25:48,803 --> 00:25:50,692 gratia payment issue . Now , as a 652 00:25:50,692 --> 00:25:52,692 matter of fact , uh and as far as I 653 00:25:52,692 --> 00:25:55,850 know , the exact timing and delivery 654 00:25:55,860 --> 00:25:59,460 method has not been solidified . As for 655 00:26:00,340 --> 00:26:02,820 relocation , as you know , the 656 00:26:02,820 --> 00:26:05,060 secretary fully supports that and we've 657 00:26:05,060 --> 00:26:07,282 said that numerous times . Uh obviously 658 00:26:07,282 --> 00:26:09,449 we're going to do everything we can to 659 00:26:09,449 --> 00:26:11,504 support the State Department as they 660 00:26:11,504 --> 00:26:13,504 try to affect the relocation of the 661 00:26:13,504 --> 00:26:15,727 family members . If I could just make a 662 00:26:15,727 --> 00:26:17,671 request , if there's any update we 663 00:26:17,671 --> 00:26:17,190 could get to where it is in the process . 664 00:26:17,190 --> 00:26:19,780 You talked about timing , uh if there's 665 00:26:19,780 --> 00:26:21,447 a tangible update to give you 666 00:26:21,447 --> 00:26:23,447 absolutely will . But I do not know 667 00:26:23,447 --> 00:26:25,280 that they have , I have anything 668 00:26:25,280 --> 00:26:27,613 tangibly today to add to the discussion . 669 00:26:27,613 --> 00:26:29,850 Uh see Jared suba al monitor . 670 00:26:32,140 --> 00:26:34,850 Yeah . Hi , Mr Kirby thanks . I'm just 671 00:26:34,850 --> 00:26:37,072 wondering if there's a date set for the 672 00:26:37,072 --> 00:26:39,072 next round of dialogue with Turkish 673 00:26:39,072 --> 00:26:41,620 officials on this FF 35 resolution and 674 00:26:41,620 --> 00:26:43,787 that I'm aware of Jared . But you know 675 00:26:43,787 --> 00:26:45,953 what ? We'll take the questions a fair 676 00:26:45,953 --> 00:26:48,176 one and I'll see if we have anything to 677 00:26:48,176 --> 00:26:50,120 add . But I just I don't know that 678 00:26:50,120 --> 00:26:52,231 there's there's another discussion on 679 00:26:52,231 --> 00:26:55,450 the schedule . Yeah , Thank you . So 680 00:26:55,460 --> 00:26:57,570 there has been or there have been 681 00:26:57,580 --> 00:27:00,490 speculations about potential Turkish 682 00:27:00,500 --> 00:27:02,980 military operation against sdf forces 683 00:27:02,980 --> 00:27:06,360 in uh Northern Syria today , 684 00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:09,370 Sputnik news agency had a report 685 00:27:09,380 --> 00:27:12,670 quoting unnamed source that 686 00:27:13,140 --> 00:27:15,590 basically claiming that the operation 687 00:27:15,590 --> 00:27:17,812 is going to happen on Tuesday . So , my 688 00:27:17,812 --> 00:27:19,890 question is this , have you seen any 689 00:27:19,900 --> 00:27:21,789 movement on the ground that would 690 00:27:21,790 --> 00:27:24,320 indicate such an operation is imminent ? 691 00:27:24,330 --> 00:27:26,250 Are you in touch with Turkish 692 00:27:26,250 --> 00:27:28,910 counterpart on potential operation ? 693 00:27:28,910 --> 00:27:31,730 And what's the department position 694 00:27:31,740 --> 00:27:34,840 about such a military operation ? If it 695 00:27:34,850 --> 00:27:37,210 happens ? You're asking a lot of ifs 696 00:27:37,210 --> 00:27:39,210 terrified a lot of speculation on 697 00:27:39,220 --> 00:27:41,780 military operations that are beyond our 698 00:27:41,780 --> 00:27:43,891 control here at the pentagon . So , I 699 00:27:43,891 --> 00:27:46,058 don't have anything on these reports . 700 00:27:46,058 --> 00:27:48,224 Um , and even if we did , I doubt that 701 00:27:48,224 --> 00:27:50,058 we would use the podium to speak 702 00:27:50,058 --> 00:27:52,224 specifically about what another nation 703 00:27:52,224 --> 00:27:54,280 state military might or might not do 704 00:27:54,280 --> 00:27:56,460 operationally ? Members of the Syrian 705 00:27:56,460 --> 00:27:58,590 democratic forces are our partners in 706 00:27:58,590 --> 00:28:00,646 the fight against ISIS in Syria ? We 707 00:28:00,646 --> 00:28:02,701 take that partnership seriously . We 708 00:28:02,701 --> 00:28:04,479 continue to work with them uh , 709 00:28:04,479 --> 00:28:06,860 specifically and solely on the ISIS 710 00:28:06,860 --> 00:28:08,582 threat in Syria . And it's our 711 00:28:08,582 --> 00:28:10,416 expectation that that kind of co 712 00:28:10,416 --> 00:28:12,416 operation and those operations will 713 00:28:12,416 --> 00:28:14,582 continue . As for what the Turks might 714 00:28:14,582 --> 00:28:16,693 or might not do . I would suggest you 715 00:28:16,693 --> 00:28:18,804 you talk to the folks in Ankara about 716 00:28:18,804 --> 00:28:20,860 that with such an operation , put us 717 00:28:20,860 --> 00:28:22,971 soldiers in danger or the cooperation 718 00:28:22,971 --> 00:28:24,960 with the SdF one , ISIS , would it 719 00:28:25,140 --> 00:28:27,251 you're suggesting that they're not in 720 00:28:27,251 --> 00:28:29,362 harm's way . Now , I mean , operating 721 00:28:29,362 --> 00:28:31,780 in Syria , helping the SDF against ISIS 722 00:28:31,780 --> 00:28:33,780 because they very much are , and we 723 00:28:33,780 --> 00:28:35,750 take uh they take that very , very 724 00:28:35,750 --> 00:28:38,360 seriously and just like anywhere else 725 00:28:38,360 --> 00:28:40,582 our troops are involved in operations . 726 00:28:40,582 --> 00:28:42,693 They have the right of protection and 727 00:28:42,693 --> 00:28:44,916 self defense and they will Absolutely . 728 00:28:44,916 --> 00:28:47,027 That's our expectation that they will 729 00:28:47,027 --> 00:28:47,010 that they will execute that right and 730 00:28:47,010 --> 00:28:49,121 responsibility as appropriate . But I 731 00:28:49,121 --> 00:28:51,343 don't want to speculate about something 732 00:28:51,343 --> 00:28:54,090 that is in Sputnik news by an unnamed 733 00:28:54,090 --> 00:28:56,257 source . I just don't think that would 734 00:28:56,257 --> 00:28:59,580 be a valuable use of time today coming 735 00:28:59,580 --> 00:29:03,130 out of Turkey basically . Uh I'm just 736 00:29:03,130 --> 00:29:05,550 not using Sputnik news as a as a valid 737 00:29:05,550 --> 00:29:07,772 source of information . And and I would 738 00:29:07,772 --> 00:29:09,994 suggest you don't either . I think this 739 00:29:09,994 --> 00:29:12,050 is these are questions that are fair 740 00:29:12,050 --> 00:29:14,272 but probably better put to officials in 741 00:29:14,272 --> 00:29:16,680 Ankara . I wasn't suggesting that the U . 742 00:29:16,680 --> 00:29:19,430 S . Troops are not in danger but added 743 00:29:19,440 --> 00:29:21,551 danger of such an operation . I think 744 00:29:21,551 --> 00:29:23,440 they're well aware of the dangers 745 00:29:23,440 --> 00:29:25,496 within which the environment they're 746 00:29:25,496 --> 00:29:27,662 operating here . When asked about Iran 747 00:29:27,662 --> 00:29:29,829 yesterday , the Secretary of State did 748 00:29:29,829 --> 00:29:32,170 say that all options are on the table . 749 00:29:32,840 --> 00:29:35,007 Should we understand that the military 750 00:29:35,007 --> 00:29:37,118 option is an option for the president 751 00:29:37,118 --> 00:29:39,284 to use and we are ready for our job is 752 00:29:39,284 --> 00:29:41,451 to make sure that the president always 753 00:29:41,451 --> 00:29:43,480 has options . Does it mean that the 754 00:29:43,480 --> 00:29:45,758 military option is part of the options ? 755 00:29:46,240 --> 00:29:48,407 Our job is to provide the commander in 756 00:29:48,407 --> 00:29:50,629 chief options here and I'm not going to 757 00:29:50,629 --> 00:29:52,684 go beyond that . Are you to question 758 00:29:52,684 --> 00:29:54,684 your decision to pull the video and 759 00:29:54,684 --> 00:29:56,296 images ? Was that related or 760 00:29:56,296 --> 00:29:58,518 coordinated with the State Department's 761 00:29:58,518 --> 00:30:00,740 request . It was the decision was fully 762 00:30:00,740 --> 00:30:02,740 coordinated inside the inter agency 763 00:30:02,740 --> 00:30:04,684 with the National Security Council 764 00:30:04,684 --> 00:30:04,080 staff and the State Department . 765 00:30:04,090 --> 00:30:06,690 Absolutely . 100% we made we made no 766 00:30:06,690 --> 00:30:08,746 secret of the fact that we felt this 767 00:30:08,746 --> 00:30:10,912 was the right thing to do . The second 768 00:30:10,912 --> 00:30:12,801 question . At what point does the 769 00:30:12,801 --> 00:30:14,579 secretary comment or confirm or 770 00:30:14,579 --> 00:30:16,912 acknowledge the chinese hypersonic test . 771 00:30:16,912 --> 00:30:16,550 You keep saying that the pacing 772 00:30:16,550 --> 00:30:18,560 challenge and yet we've heard no 773 00:30:18,560 --> 00:30:20,449 confirmation of one of the latest 774 00:30:20,449 --> 00:30:22,227 examples that makes them facing 775 00:30:22,227 --> 00:30:24,282 challenge . I have nothing to add to 776 00:30:24,282 --> 00:30:26,504 that today or in . Yeah two questions . 777 00:30:26,504 --> 00:30:28,671 The first one is a follow up on Tony's 778 00:30:28,671 --> 00:30:31,590 question . Uh Does an overly strict 779 00:30:31,600 --> 00:30:33,900 classification system sometimes make it 780 00:30:33,900 --> 00:30:36,020 difficult for the Defense Department 781 00:30:36,030 --> 00:30:38,690 enterprise too acquire the most cutting 782 00:30:38,690 --> 00:30:42,240 edge technology because it makes it 783 00:30:42,240 --> 00:30:44,518 hard to publish some of the apartments . 784 00:30:44,518 --> 00:30:48,340 Yes sir . No I mean we can 785 00:30:48,340 --> 00:30:50,680 work , we have a long history of 786 00:30:50,680 --> 00:30:52,600 working with our defense industry 787 00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:54,211 colleagues and that requires 788 00:30:54,211 --> 00:30:55,933 communications of a classified 789 00:30:55,933 --> 00:30:58,100 sensitive nature and we still are able 790 00:30:58,100 --> 00:31:00,080 to do that . My second question is 791 00:31:00,080 --> 00:31:02,140 about the first lady's visit today 792 00:31:02,150 --> 00:31:04,410 Earlier today to military support 793 00:31:04,420 --> 00:31:07,730 activity in uh She was going to a D . O . 794 00:31:07,730 --> 00:31:10,250 D . School . Yeah exactly . Um Could 795 00:31:10,250 --> 00:31:12,472 you talk a little bit about some of the 796 00:31:12,472 --> 00:31:14,472 unique challenges that the families 797 00:31:14,472 --> 00:31:17,070 living overseas ? Uh My face . Yeah . 798 00:31:17,740 --> 00:31:20,030 Uh I myself was stationed at that base 799 00:31:20,030 --> 00:31:22,197 in Naples lived just a block away from 800 00:31:22,197 --> 00:31:24,030 that school where she's uh she's 801 00:31:24,030 --> 00:31:27,640 visiting um ah look overseas 802 00:31:27,640 --> 00:31:31,050 assignments , it would be easy to say 803 00:31:31,050 --> 00:31:33,170 that they're all hard . There's a 804 00:31:33,170 --> 00:31:35,114 difficulty about that . There's no 805 00:31:35,114 --> 00:31:37,170 question about you removed from your 806 00:31:37,170 --> 00:31:39,630 normal environment . Um and uh you're 807 00:31:39,630 --> 00:31:41,970 plopped down into a new culture . Um 808 00:31:41,980 --> 00:31:45,620 uh you know , you 809 00:31:45,620 --> 00:31:47,509 still you still have a network of 810 00:31:47,509 --> 00:31:49,676 friends and uh and colleagues that you 811 00:31:49,676 --> 00:31:51,842 can work with and your kids can engage 812 00:31:51,842 --> 00:31:54,009 with and go to school with every day , 813 00:31:54,009 --> 00:31:56,120 but you're still in a foreign country 814 00:31:56,120 --> 00:31:56,120 and uh and there's lots of learning 815 00:31:56,120 --> 00:31:58,700 that that's required uh for that . But 816 00:31:58,700 --> 00:32:00,922 I think anybody who has served overseas 817 00:32:00,922 --> 00:32:02,978 permanently , I mean I'm not talking 818 00:32:02,978 --> 00:32:05,089 about deployments , I'm talking about 819 00:32:05,089 --> 00:32:07,144 permanently stationed overseas uh in 820 00:32:07,144 --> 00:32:09,490 the country of uh like like Italy or 821 00:32:09,490 --> 00:32:11,930 Japan South Korea , you know an ally 822 00:32:11,930 --> 00:32:13,763 and a partner will tell you that 823 00:32:13,763 --> 00:32:15,819 there's an awful lot of reward to to 824 00:32:15,819 --> 00:32:18,041 learn a new culture to immerse yourself 825 00:32:18,041 --> 00:32:20,097 in a new environment , maybe learn a 826 00:32:20,097 --> 00:32:22,152 language uh and really opens up your 827 00:32:22,152 --> 00:32:24,263 perspective on the importance of what 828 00:32:24,263 --> 00:32:26,590 it means to be um in the Armed Forces 829 00:32:26,590 --> 00:32:28,590 of the United States . So uh yeah , 830 00:32:28,590 --> 00:32:31,640 it's it can be stressful because you 831 00:32:31,640 --> 00:32:35,220 are again going to literally a a 832 00:32:35,230 --> 00:32:37,230 foreign land . But boy , there's an 833 00:32:37,230 --> 00:32:39,341 awful lot of benefits to and with the 834 00:32:39,341 --> 00:32:41,563 secretary and it just gets to the thing 835 00:32:41,563 --> 00:32:43,730 I opened with today with the secretary 836 00:32:43,730 --> 00:32:45,619 wants to make sure is that we are 837 00:32:45,619 --> 00:32:47,730 staying mindful of the challenges and 838 00:32:47,730 --> 00:32:49,897 the stressors on our families here and 839 00:32:49,897 --> 00:32:52,008 abroad and that we're addressing them 840 00:32:52,008 --> 00:32:51,990 as best we can . And so we're 841 00:32:51,990 --> 00:32:54,310 enormously grateful that the first lady 842 00:32:54,310 --> 00:32:56,960 is taking time out of her busy agenda 843 00:32:57,440 --> 00:32:59,662 to visit with the D . O . D . School at 844 00:32:59,662 --> 00:33:01,607 Naples Italy and having again been 845 00:33:01,607 --> 00:33:03,662 stationed there and that was a while 846 00:33:03,662 --> 00:33:05,884 ago . But um that is a fine educational 847 00:33:05,884 --> 00:33:07,940 institution and uh , I know that the 848 00:33:07,940 --> 00:33:10,162 teachers there who work all our D . O . 849 00:33:10,162 --> 00:33:12,273 D . Teachers who worked so incredibly 850 00:33:12,273 --> 00:33:14,384 hard uh will be very grateful for her 851 00:33:14,384 --> 00:33:13,770 visit as well . The students and the 852 00:33:13,770 --> 00:33:16,760 families . Okay . We got one more Tony . 853 00:33:17,140 --> 00:33:19,610 The example of the pulling temporarily 854 00:33:19,620 --> 00:33:21,960 pulling the videos and pictures are 855 00:33:21,960 --> 00:33:23,904 still , is that an example of this 856 00:33:23,904 --> 00:33:26,160 balancing act between transparency . 857 00:33:26,260 --> 00:33:28,410 Classification that you so eloquently 858 00:33:28,410 --> 00:33:31,740 talked about . Thank you for the look 859 00:33:31,740 --> 00:33:34,290 when the comment comment . But no , 860 00:33:34,300 --> 00:33:37,180 actually I don't consider that so much 861 00:33:37,190 --> 00:33:39,246 a balance between classification and 862 00:33:39,246 --> 00:33:42,780 transparency for us and for our 863 00:33:42,780 --> 00:33:44,947 interagency colleagues . This was very 864 00:33:44,947 --> 00:33:47,370 much about helping protect as best we 865 00:33:47,370 --> 00:33:49,920 can . The identities of our afghan 866 00:33:49,920 --> 00:33:52,640 friends and allies . It wasn't , I mean 867 00:33:52,640 --> 00:33:54,751 the photographs were not classified , 868 00:33:54,751 --> 00:33:56,973 know where the images and they will get 869 00:33:56,973 --> 00:33:59,084 republished . Absolutely . There have 870 00:33:59,084 --> 00:34:01,084 just been temporarily archives . So 871 00:34:01,084 --> 00:34:03,251 it's not really the same balance about 872 00:34:03,251 --> 00:34:05,418 classification and transparency . This 873 00:34:05,418 --> 00:34:07,418 was an abundance of caution that we 874 00:34:07,418 --> 00:34:09,584 felt was necessary in keeping with our 875 00:34:09,584 --> 00:34:11,900 obligation to protect the identities of 876 00:34:11,900 --> 00:34:13,956 our afghan allies and partners . And 877 00:34:13,956 --> 00:34:16,920 again , when we don't feel that that 878 00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:19,900 need is there , then we will absolutely 879 00:34:19,900 --> 00:34:21,678 republish them . It's not about 880 00:34:21,678 --> 00:34:23,844 classification because they're they're 881 00:34:23,844 --> 00:34:25,956 unclassified images . They were up on 882 00:34:25,956 --> 00:34:25,840 David's for a long , long time , some 883 00:34:25,840 --> 00:34:27,896 of them for , you know , more than a 884 00:34:27,896 --> 00:34:30,062 decade and they'll get back up there . 885 00:34:30,062 --> 00:34:31,896 We promised that . Okay . Thanks 886 00:34:31,896 --> 00:34:35,470 everybody . Mhm . Yeah . Right .